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INTRODUCTION 
 
Traditional principles of judicial review dictate that the courts are concerned with assessing only 
the lawfulness of administrative decision-making rather than its merits.1 For example, Lord 
Irvine, a previous Lord Chancellor, has justified this on the basis of three arguments. First, ‘a 
constitutional imperative’: public authorities should exercise discretionary powers that have been 
entrusted to them by Parliament. Every authority has within its influence a level of knowledge 
and experience which justifies the decision of Parliament to entrust that authority with decision-
making power. Second, ‘lack of judicial expertise’: it follows that the courts are ill-equipped to 
take decisions in place of the designated authority. Third, ‘the democratic imperative’: it has 
long been recognised that elected public authorities, and particularly local authorities, derive 
their authority in part from their electoral mandate.2 These three imperatives are grounded, of 
course, in the constitutional principle of the separation of powers between the organs of the 
state.3 Though this ideal has never been strictly adhered to in the UK, it is still accepted as an 
important principle of constitutional law.4 Indeed, it has been strengthened in recent years with 
the coming into force of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), incorporating certain Articles of 
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the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) into UK Law,5 such as Article 6, the right 
to a fair trial by an independent and unbiased court or tribunal, and the Constitutional Reform 
Act 2005 (CRA),6 section 3 of which upholds the independence of the judiciary.7 
 
   Nevertheless, is this theory that the courts’ supervisory role in reviewing only the legality of 
executive action respected by the judiciary in practice? If not, what are the implications of this 
for administrative law doctrine in the 21st Century? Is the judicial review of merits a usurpation 
of the power of the executive by the courts? Or is it something more benign? A matter of 
evolution, a natural repositioning of the judiciary within the normal jockeying for power that 
exists amongst the institutions of the state? Or is it something more systematic? If some 
administrative power has been ceded to the courts in, for example, the pursuit of furthering 
human rights’ protection, perhaps with Parliament’s approval, we are arguably witnessing a 
legitimate shift in the constitutional balance between the courts and the executive. But what now 
are the boundaries of this increased power of the judiciary? 
 
   This article is the third piece of work on the Wednesbury/irrationality ground of judicial 
review.8 In the first article of this study the author attempted to address the question whether the 
courts were in practice respecting the constitutional principle that they should not be engaging in 
a review of merits when assessing the exercise of administrative action.9 He analysed several 
cases where the courts had ruled that the executive body in question had acted irrationally and 
questioned whether the facts in some of these cases could be categorised as unreasonable in a 
public law sense. That is, by reference to the standard of review implied by Lord Diplock’s 
definition of irrationality in the GCHQ case, were the decisions of the executive “so outrageous 
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in [their] defiance of logic and accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied 
his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at [them]”?10 In finding that the case 
facts in some of these cases arguably did not support judicial intervention, the author concluded 
that low standards of irrationality had been adopted, thus causing the judges to review the merits 
of the decisions under consideration.11 Having found that the courts were employing low 
standards of judicial intervention, the author sought in the second article of this study to question 
whether these reviews of merits he had identified previously were in fact legitimate.12 There it 
was concluded that these low standards were constitutionally justified: either because, for 
example, the “proportionality” test13 had been employed instead of irrationality or the courts had 
exercised an “anxious scrutiny”14 approach to breaches of fundamental rights. For reasons of word 
length the author was unable to assess, to any great degree, the effects the HRA had on the 
legitimacy of these merits-review cases. This is one of the aims of this third article since 
arguably this statute now renders the applicability of the “anxious scrutiny” approach redundant. 
The author finds here that the constitutionality of these low standards of judicial intervention 
identified previously has been significantly widened since the coming into force of the HRA in 
2000. However, the principle of the separation of powers, although not strictly enforced in the 
UK, must still oppose a merger of the judicial and executive functions. To this end, in 
reassessing here the legitimacy of the courts’ review of the merits of administrative action post 
the enactment of the HRA, this article also proposes to establish the limits of this increase in 
judicial power, that is, a zone of executive decision-making, for reasons of democracy, where the 
courts are clearly excluded. 
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THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998 (HRA) AND  
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (ECHR) 
  
The HRA allows individuals to enforce ‘Convention rights’ in domestic courts. It incorporated 
some of the Articles of the ECHR15 into domestic law principally through section 3(1):  “So far 
as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given 
effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights.” In interpreting primary and 
secondary legislation, the courts according to section 2 are under a duty to take into account the 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). If a court cannot interpret a statute 
“so far as it is possible to do so” section 4(2) of the HRA provides for a “legislative review”:16 
“If the court is satisfied that the provision is incompatible with a Convention right, it may make a 
declaration of incompatibility.” A declaration of incompatibility is not an order invalidating an 
Act of Parliament on the basis that it infringes a Convention right. Amending offending primary 
legislation to make it Convention compatible is the preserve of the executive through a fast track 
procedure under section 10 of the HRA.17 However, the judicial review of secondary legislation 
because of an infringement of a Convention right is not excluded: the HRA creates a free-
standing statutory head of review on the grounds of illegality. Section 6(1) – “applied review”18 – 
states: “It is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a 
Convention right.” Nevertheless, despite applicants now being able to enforce ‘Convention 
rights’ in UK law by virtue of the HRA, this does not preclude the availability of traditional 
irrationality review, and its “anxious scrutiny” avenue,19 since the procedural rules for the two 
approaches do differ.20 
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The legitimacy of low standards of intervention and “qualified” Convention rights  
 
In determining breaches of the ECHR the ECtHR applies the test of proportionality to “qualified 
rights”, Articles 8-11. Once a reviewing court has been convinced by the legitimacy of the aim 
identified by the state for infringing, for example, a fundamental right of the applicant, and there 
was a reasonable nexus between the means to achieve the aim and the aim itself, such as national 
security or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, it must then consider whether there 
was a pressing social need for the infringement of the right. In asking itself the latter question, the 
reviewing court is determining whether the means are proportionate to the legitimate aim being 
pursued. The case of Regina (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department21 in the House of 
Lords establishes that the test must be applied by the UK courts when considering breaches of 
qualified rights under the ECHR.  
 
   In Daly the court held that the blanket policy of the Secretary of State – the requirement that a 
prisoner be absent during cell searches whenever privileged legal correspondence held by them 
was examined but not read – was unlawful. Although the state had identified a legitimate aim 
under Article 8(2) of the ECHR for the policy – the prevention of crime – Lord Bingham said: 
“The infringement of prisoners’ rights to maintain the confidentiality of their privileged legal 
correspondence is greater than is shown to be necessary to serve the legitimate public objectives 
already identified”.22  
 
   The courts could not conceivably employ such a process of review, where they are comparing the 
weight to be attached to the private right of the applicant which has been infringed with the 
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competing public interest justification for infringing that right, without being involved in some 
adjudication of the merits of the state’s action. The proportionality test is, therefore, a more 
searching method of review than the irrationality test, the latter simply requiring the executive 
decision-maker to remain within an area of rational responses. 
 
   The most famous application of the proportionality test to date by the House of Lords was 
probably in Regina (A) v Secretary of State for the Home Department,23 which Feldman has 
described as “perhaps the most powerful judicial defence of liberty since [1772]”.24 By a 
majority of 8-1 an unprecedented panel of nine Law Lords quashed the derogation order issued 
by the UK government under Article 15 of the ECHR,25 in relation to the Part IV provisions of 
the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA), the indefinite detention of foreign 
individuals suspected of international terrorism. The court held that the provisions were 
disproportionate to the existing terrorist threat as they were not strictly required by the 
exigencies of the situation as required by Article 15,26 thus exposing ATCSA to a declaration of 
incompatibility with Article 5 of the ECHR, the right to liberty and security of the person. Lord 
Hoffmann said: “The real threat to the life of the nation, in the sense of a people living in 
accordance with its traditional laws and political values, comes not from terrorism but from laws 
such as these”.27 His Lordship even went as far as stating that there was no war or public 
emergency threatening the life of the nation which justified the derogation under Article 15.28  
 
   Clearly, therefore, a review of merits by domestic courts is justified where they employ the 
proportionality test to certain breaches of ‘Convention’ rights. However, in the international 
sphere the ECtHR has adopted the “margin of appreciation” principle. This reflects a degree of 
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latitude to be shown by the court to the signatory states of the ECHR (the Council of Europe) on 
account of the social and cultural differences which exist between them.  This margin of 
appreciation is not necessarily evident in the various Articles of the ECHR under consideration 
but often the context in which an Article arises such as economic factors (the raising of taxes and 
the allocation of national resources) or public morality.  
 
   In Handyside v United Kingdom,29 for example, the ECtHR ruled that the decision of the UK to 
prosecute the distributor of the Little Red Schoolbook under the Obscene Publications Act 1959 
for the purpose of protecting public morals was lawful. Yes, the court applied the proportionality 
test – a proportionate balance had been struck by the state between the private right of the 
applicant to freedom of expression under Article 10(1) and the public interest to protect the 
morals of children and young people under Article 10(2) 30 – but it is submitted that the court did 
not do so to any great degree. The margin of appreciation shown by the court in Handyside, 
notwithstanding that the book was freely available in other European countries, signifies a 
willingness not to engage in a significant review of the merits of the UK’s activities in curtailing 
the book’s distribution. Herein lies a contradiction. The author asserts at the beginning of this 
article that questions about the legality of administrative decision-making do not involve a 
reviewing court in a consideration of merits. However, at this point it is implied that high 
standards of proportionality are lawful, though the very nature of the test does entertain the 
notion of balance.  
 
   In assessing in this third article the constitutionality of low standards of judicial intervention 
since the coming into force of the HRA, there is a need to explore more fully the meaning of 
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merits-review which has not been required in this study hitherto. The traditional view of judicial 
review is that the courts are concerned only with the lawfulness of an administrative decision 
rather than its merits. This is perhaps reflected in traditional definitions of unreasonableness. In 
the GCHQ case, it will be recalled, Lord Diplock’s described an irrational decision as being “so 
outrageous in its defiance of logic and accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had 
applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it”.31 However, even when 
employing orthodox standards of irrationality there must still be some reviewing of the merits of 
a decision; traditional conceptions of legality must still require a consideration of competing 
factors supporting or not supporting a particular course of administrative action. With 
irrationality the measure of discretion is clearly in the executive’s favour but determining 
whether a decision was “outrageous in its defiance of logic” must still require some assessment 
of merits, albeit not to any great degree. For the purposes of this article, therefore, where 
standards of judicial intervention are examined, and some of these standards are found to be 
particularly intensive, strictly speaking, low thresholds involve the courts in a greater 
consideration of merits than would otherwise categorise a customary application for judicial 
review.  
 
   Despite the margin of appreciation principle being applicable in a supra-national context there 
may a margin of appreciation of sorts – either “a discretionary area of judgment”,  “a margin of 
discretion” or “judicial deference”32 – adopted by the UK courts when considering infringements 
of the ECHR under the HRA. In this regard, it is unlikely that a significant examination of the 
merits of suspected breaches of Convention rights will take place in domestic law where a 
balance is to be struck between private and state interests such as public morality. To support this 
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submission there is the ruling of the House of Lords in Belfast City Council v Miss Behavin' 
Limited.33 Here a decision by Belfast City Council not to grant licenses to sex shops in a specific 
area of Belfast was not unlawful, the courts held. The House of Lords ruled that that this was an 
interference with Article 10(1) of the ECHR, the right to freedom of expression, but was a 
proportionate response to a legitimate aim identified in Article 10(2), the protection of public 
morals. For example, Lord Hoffmann said: 
 
 
The right to vend pornography is not the most important right of free expression in a 
democratic society…This is an area of social control in which the Strasbourg court has always 
accorded a wide margin of appreciation to member States, which in terms of the domestic 
constitution translates into the broad power of judgment entrusted to local authorities by the 
legislature. If the local authority exercises that power rationally and in accordance with the 
purposes of the statute, it would require very unusual facts for it to amount to a 
disproportionate restriction on Convention rights. That was not the case here.34 
 
 
   The courts’ employment of the proportionality test here arguably did not involve it in 
examining the merits of the council’s decision with any great intensity. The public interest of the 
state so obviously outweighed the private right of the applicant to such a degree that the standard 
of proportionality adopted by the House of Lords was a high one. To this end, compelling the 
council to give a strong justification for infringing freedom of expression, where the court was 
satisfied that a reasonable nexus has been shown to arise between the infringement of the right 
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and the objective of  protecting the public morals of individuals living in Belfast, would 
therefore not have been a legitimate judicial exercise. 
 
   In summary, the courts are justified in adopting low standards of intervention when assessing, 
for example, the engagement of qualified rights of the ECHR, since to do so necessitates the 
employment of the proportionality approach. However, it has also been shown that contextual 
factors such as the protection of public morals do limit the degree to which the courts should 
adopt the intensity of proportionality. In this respect, there are boundaries to a greater judicial 
review of the merits of executive decisions affecting qualified rights. In ECHR law some rights 
do not employ a proportionality type of review. For example, there are rights which are 
categorised as “absolute”. Do these rights justify low standards of judicial intervention?  
 
The legitimacy of low standards of intervention and “absolute” Convention rights  
 
Article 2 of the ECHR, the right to life, Article 3 of the ECHR, the prohibition on torture or 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Article 4(1) of the ECHR, the prohibition on 
slavery and forced labour, and Article 7(1) of the ECHR, the prohibition on punishment without 
law, are unique in Convention law in that they are absolute. That is, there are no qualifications 
such as the objective of either protecting national security or preventing disorder or crime 
justifying their infringement. Moreover, Article 15(1) of the ECHR – the right to derogate from 
some Articles of the Convention in times of war or public emergency threatening the life of the 
nation – does not apply to them.35 
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   Since these rights are unqualified, they exclude the employment of the proportionality test.36 This 
may explain why Howell et al argue that the courts are unlikely to defer to the opinion of a public 
body where the right involved is absolute.37 Indeed, in the House of Lords in Regina v DPP, Ex 
parte Kebilene 38 Lord Hope said: “It will be…much less [easier for an area of judgment to be 
recognised where the Convention right itself]…is stated in terms which are unqualified”.39 As a 
practical example of the legitimate low standards exercised by the courts where absolute 
Convention rights are at issue, there is the ruling of the Administrative Court in Regina (Bennett) 
v Inner South London Coroner,40 which involved the fatal shooting by police of Derek Bennett. 
It was stated above that the proportionality test is excluded from reviews of absolute rights. 
However, Article 2(2) of the ECHR permits agents of the state to exercise lethal force where it is 
“absolutely necessary” and for a legitimate aim, such as the protection of individuals from 
unlawful violence. This is certainly a balancing exercise – but one in which the balance falls very 
firmly in favour of the person whose life has been denied. In McCann v United Kingdom41 the 
ECtHR said:  
 
 
The use of the term “absolutely necessary” in Article 2(2) indicates that a stricter and more 
compelling test of necessity must be employed from that normally applicable when 
determining whether State action is “necessary in a democratic society” under paragraph 2 of 
Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention. In particular, the force used must be strictly proportionate 
to the achievement of the aims set out in sub-paragraphs 2(a), (b) and (c) of Article 2.42 
 
 
   Specifically, the court in Bennett was assessing two issues: first, the reasonableness of the 
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coroner’s decision not to leave open to the inquest jury a possible verdict of unlawful killing by 
the police; and secondly, the compatibility of the defence of self defence in UK criminal law 
with Article 2.43 However, in so doing, the court did recognise the applicability of the McCann 
principles to domestic law. That is, where the right to life is at issue, and indeed in situations 
where a person has been fatally shot, the court will examine very closely the justifications given 
by the police for the “absolute need” to kill someone. 
 
   In illustrating further the legitimacy of low standards of review when considering breaches of 
absolute rights of the ECHR, specifically Article 3, the ruling of the House of Lords in Regina 
(Limbuela) v Secretary of State for the Home Department44 can also be identified. Here the court 
had to consider the lawfulness of refusing three asylum seekers state support, since they had 
failed to make a claim for asylum as soon as reasonably practicable after arriving in the United 
Kingdom under section 55(1) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. (Of the 
three claimants the longest delay in making an application for asylum was one day. Two of the 
claimants were forced to sleep rough and the third claimant was on the verge of doing so. All the 
claimants suffered a deterioration in health.) Although, Lord Bingham said that the threshold was 
high in a context such as this where the case did not involve the deliberate infliction of pain or 
suffering,45 he did state, importantly, that the threshold did not have to be crossed before there 
was an infringement of Article 3. It would occur “when it appears that on a fair and objective 
assessment of all relevant facts and circumstances that an individual applicant faces an imminent 
prospect of serious suffering caused or materially aggravated by denial of shelter, food or the 
most basic necessities of life”.46 Therefore, subject to what the judge said about the high 
threshold to be overcome in circumstances such as these, in rejecting the “wait and see” 
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argument of the Secretary of State he was, arguably, confirming an exacting nature to Article 3. 
Indeed, if this finding is incorrect, the judge was obviously implying that the threshold was low 
where the state had deliberately inflicted pain or suffering against an individual. 
 
   However, notwithstanding the conclusions drawn about the justifiability of the courts 
conducting a greater review of the merits of suspected breaches of unqualified rights than 
perhaps other rights protected by the ECHR, others commentators, such as Clayton47 and Havers 
and English,48 have taken a different view concerning the intensity with which judges examine 
infringements of absolute rights. Clayton refers to the ruling of the Court of Appeal in R (Bloggs 
61) v Secretary of State for the Home Department.49 Here the claimant prisoner contended that, 
having informed on a well known drugs trafficker, he was entitled to be detained in a protected 
witness unit and that removal from the unit would place his life at risk. His application was 
rejected. Although Auld LJ said that any potential interference with the right to life required the 
most anxious scrutiny by the court,50 it was still appropriate to show some deference to the 
special competence of the Prison Service.51 
 
   In further reference to the right to life, and the possible high standards of review exercised by 
the courts, there is the recent ruling of the House in Lords in Van Colle v Chief Constable of the 
Hertfordshire Police.52 Here the deceased, Giles Van Colle, had been shot dead by a former 
employee, Daniel Brougham, just days before he was due to give evidence for the prosecution at 
Brougham’s trial for theft.  
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   Article 2(1) of the ECHR imposes a positive or substantive obligation on the state to protect 
life: “Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law”. The House of Lords ruled that the 
Hertfordshire police had not acted unlawfully in failing to protect the life of Giles. It reached its 
conclusion by reference to the earlier ruling of the ECtHR in Osman v United Kingdom.53 In 
Osman the ECtHR had said: 
 
 
For the Court, and bearing in mind the difficulties involved in policing modern societies, the 
unpredictability of human conduct and the operational choices which must be made in terms 
of priorities and resources, such an obligation must be interpreted in a way which does not 
impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities. Accordingly, not every 
claimed risk to life can entail for the authorities a Convention requirement to take operational 
measures to prevent that risk from materialising.54  
 
 
   Although the author stated above that proportionality review is excluded from considerations 
of Article 2, the positive obligation under Article 2(1), following Osman, does require the courts 
to entertain the notion of balance: even if there is an identifiable risk to the life of a person, this 
will not engage the positive obligation to protect life if it imposes a disproportionate burden on 
state authorities. To this end, a reviewing court is obliged to weigh up a risk to life with the 
potential financial resources needed to prevent it. In confirming that this balance favours the 
state, Lord Brown in Van Colle said: 
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The test set by the European Court of Human Rights in Osman and repeatedly since applied 
for establishing a violation of the positive obligation arising under Article 2 to protect 
someone...is clearly a stringent one which will not be easily satisfied…It is indeed some 
indication of the stringency of the test that even on the comparatively extreme facts of Osman 
itself…the Strasbourg court found it not to be satisfied.55 
 
 
   The same conclusion about the potential high standard of intervention employed in Van Colle 
can be drawn about cases involving Article 3. In N v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department56 the government sought to deport an illegal immigrant back to Uganda. The 
applicant had been receiving treatment for an AIDS related illness in the UK. Uganda could not 
provide equivalent medical treatment to that which she was receiving in this country. She alleged 
that if she continued to have access to drugs and medical facilities available here, she should 
remain well for decades. But without the drugs she would die within a year. Lord Hope said that 
aliens who are subject to expulsion cannot claim any entitlement to remain in the territory of a 
contracting state in order to continue to benefit from medical, social or other forms of assistance 
provided by the expelling state. For an exception to be made where expulsion is resisted on 
medical grounds the circumstances must be exceptional.57 The fact, therefore, that the applicant’s 
deportation to Uganda would result in her death within a year clearly illustrated the court setting 
a high threshold for Article 3 here. 
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   The courts do afford the executive a little discretion when assessing infringements of absolute 
rights, as fatal shootings by the police illustrate. However, notwithstanding this finding, low 
standards of intervention are not always constitutionally justifiable: contextual matters such as 
the financial costs involved arguably affected the rulings of the judges in Van Colle and N. In the 
case of the latter, for example, the resource implications of allowing the applicant to stay in the 
UK were not lost on Lord Hope. He said:  
 
 
It must be borne in mind…that the effect of any extension…would…afford all those in the 
appellant’s condition a right of asylum in this country until such time as the standard of 
medical facilities available in their home countries for the treatment of HIV/AIDS had reached 
that which is available in Europe. It would risk drawing into the United Kingdom large 
numbers of people already suffering from HIV in the hope that they too could remain here 
indefinitely so that they could take the benefit of the medical resources that are available in 
this country. This would result in a very great and no doubt unquantifiable commitment of 
resources which it is, to say the least, highly questionable the states parties to the Convention 
would ever have agreed to.58  
 
 
   Continuing the theme of this article, what is the legitimate standard of merits-review adopted 
by the courts if they are examining breaches of other Articles of the ECHR, which, like absolute 
rights, do not permit the courts to employ a proportionality type of approach? There are, of 
course “special” rights, meaning that they can be restricted in the public interest but only to the 
extent provided by the ECHR.  
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The legitimacy of low standards of intervention and “special” Convention rights  
 
Klug states that Article 5, the right to liberty and security of the person, and Article 6, the right to 
a fair trial by an independent and impartial tribunal, have given rise to the least judicial 
deference.59 Following the ruling of the House of Lords in A (see above) the government allowed 
ATCSA to lapse in March 2005 (the legislation had a ‘sunset clause’, requiring it to be renewed, 
otherwise it would cease). It replaced ATCSA with the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (PTA), 
introducing ‘control orders’ for all terror suspects whether they were British or foreign. The PTA 
allows the state to impose ‘non-derogating control orders’ on individuals which include 
electronic tagging, curfews, restrictions on visitors and meeting others, a ban on the use of the 
internet and limits on phone communication. According to section 2 the Home Secretary can 
apply ‘non-derogating control orders’ to persons whom he reasonably suspects of involvement in 
terrorism and that the order is necessary to protect the public. Section 3 says that the reasonable 
suspicion must be approved by the High Court after the period of seven days. The PTA also 
allows for the provision of ‘derogating control orders’ (from Article 5 of the ECHR, for 
example), which amount to house arrest. These orders can be issued only by the High Court 
under section 4 and the rules for their issue are stricter than those for ‘non-derogating control 
orders’. Within hours of the passing of the PTA the Home Secretary applied ‘non-derogating 
control orders’ to ten men previously certified under ATCSA as terrorism suspects, some of 
whom had been detained without trial since December 2001.  
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   The issuing of some ‘non-derogating control orders’ under 2 section of the PTA is now 
unlawful as being contrary to Article 5 of the ECHR, the House of Lords has held: Secretary of 
State for the Home Department v JJ.60 Here the conditions depriving the liberty of the six 
applicants included: residency at a one bedroom flat, away from one’s normal home, for 18 
hours every day (1600 to 1000); electronic tagging; compulsory attendance at a police station 
twice a day; visitors to have been approved by the Home Office; limited use of the telephone; 
and a ban on the use of the internet. In holding that the conditions were unlawful, Lord Bingham 
likened the conditions to prison but without the benefit of association with others.61 Lord Brown 
said: “Article 5 represents a fundamental value and is absolute in its terms. Liberty is too 
precious a right to be discarded except in times of genuine national emergency. None is 
suggested here”.62 
 
   On average there are only about 15 individuals subject to ‘non-derogating control orders’ at 
any one time. This very small number suggests that these orders are reserved only for those 
terrorist suspects who pose a critical threat to national security. To this end, the House of Lords 
could very easily have upheld the existing conditions attached to the orders, deferring to the 
executive’s duty to protect the community from acts of terrorism. However, in relaxing the 
deprivations of liberty conferred on the suspects by the state, the court chose to subject the orders 
to particular scrutiny, it is submitted. 
 
   The issue of the admissibility of evidence against suspected terrorists held under the PTA, for 
example, where it is possibly gained through torture (thus arguably compromising Article 6 of 
the ECHR) was addressed by the House of Lords in A v Secretary of State for the Home 
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Department (No.2).63 Here the court held that evidence procured by torture, whether of a suspect 
or witness, was not admissible against a party to proceedings in a British court, irrespective of 
where, by whom or on whose authority the torture had been inflicted.64 In so doing, the House of 
Lords reversed the ruling of the Court of Appeal65 which had said that evidence obtained under 
torture in third countries could be used in special terrorism cases, provided that the British 
government had neither procured it nor connived at it. This was because it was unrealistic to 
expect the Home Secretary to investigate each statement with a view to deciding whether the 
circumstances in which it was obtained involved a breach of the ECHR.66 The fact that the House 
of Lords rejected this approach by the Court of Appeal suggests that a low standard of review 
was adopted. 
 
   More recently, in Regina v Davis67 the House of Lords had to assess the fairness of the 
defendant’s trial for murder in the context of Article 6 of the ECHR and the common law. Seven 
witnesses had claimed to be in fear for their lives if it became known that they had given 
evidence against the defendant. Among them were three witnesses, the only witnesses in the case 
who were able to identify the defendant as the killer. These claims about risks to personal safety 
were investigated and accepted as genuine by the trial judge and the Court of Appeal. To induce 
the witnesses to give evidence, the trial judge ordered that: 1) they were each to give evidence 
under a pseudonym 2) their addresses and personal details were to be withheld from the 
defendant and his legal advisers 3) defence counsel was not permitted to ask any questions which 
might enable any of the three witnesses to be identified 4) they were to give evidence behind 
screens so that they could be seen by the judge and the jury but not by the defendant and 5) their 
natural voices were to be heard only by the judge and the jury.68 The House of Lords held that no 
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conviction should be based solely or to a decisive extent upon the statements or testimony of 
anonymous witnesses. The reason was that such a conviction results from a trial which could not 
be regarded as fair.69  
 
   The author believes here that the House of Lords in these three cases, JJ, A (No.2), and Davis, 
signified a willingness to adopt an intensive standard of intervention – even to the point in 
allowing the possible collapse of a murder trial (in Davis), notwithstanding the fact that the 
defendant was a dangerous individual who had been identified by three witnesses as a killer. A 
greater judicial review of the merits of administrative decisions where special rights of the 
ECHR are at issue is therefore arguably legitimate. 
 
   However, as regards Article 6 of the ECHR, for example, the degree of deference accorded to 
the executive is sometimes high: Regina (Alconbury Developments Ltd) v Secretary of State for 
the Environment, Transport and the Regions.70 Here the House of Lords was assessing the 
legality of the ‘calling-in’ procedure exercised by the Secretary of State under section 77 of the 
Town and Country Planning Act 1990. The court said that although the Secretary of State was 
not independent and impartial, decisions taken by him were not incompatible with Article 6(1), 
provided they were subject to review by an independent and impartial tribunal which had full 
jurisdiction to deal with the case as the nature of the decision required. Furthermore, when the 
decision under consideration was one of administrative policy, the reviewing body was not 
required to have full power to redetermine the merits of the decision and any review by a court 
of the merits of such a policy decision taken by a minister answerable to Parliament and 
ultimately to the electorate would be profoundly undemocratic.  
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   In a similar context – the possible lack of independence and impartiality of a local authority 
officer reviewing a decision to house a homeless person in a location which the applicant had 
considered unsuitable for her and her family – Lord Bingham in the House of Lords in Runa 
Begum v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council71 also said 
 
 
I can see no warrant for applying in this context notions of ‘anxious scrutiny’…I would also 
demur at the suggestion of Laws LJ in the Court of Appeal in the present case…that the judge 
may subject the decision to ‘a close and rigorous analysis’ if by that is meant an analysis 
closer or more rigorous than would ordinarily and properly be conducted by a careful and 
competent judge determining the application for judicial review.72 
 
 
   The courts are arguably justified in a greater review of the merits of administrative decisions 
affecting special rights of the ECHR but, similar to the findings above in relation to qualified 
rights and absolute rights, the employment of low standards of intervention are not unfettered. 
Some contextual factors such as the availability of traditional irrationality review as a fail safe 
against the unlawful exercise of statutory powers of Ministers in planning law, for example, 
ought to limit the courts’ discretion to assess special rights with any great intensity.  
 
   Questions about the degree to which the courts legitimately review the merits of Articles of the 
ECHR under the HRA do not stop there: what would be the legitimate standard of intervention if 
a court was not necessarily assessing the lawfulness of executive action by reference to a 
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particular Article of the ECHR under section 6(1) of the HRA but was exercising its obligation 
to interpret statutes in line with Convention rights under section 3(1) of the HRA, or was 
considering a declaration of incompatibility under section 4(2) of the HRA? These questions are 
addressed in the next two sections. 
 
The legitimacy of low standards of intervention and section 3(1) of the HRA 
 
It will be recalled that section 3(1) of the HRA is an interpretative obligation. It requires the 
courts in any proceedings, whether they be civil or criminal, private or public, to interpret 
primary and secondary legislation “so far is it possible to do so” in line with Convention rights. 
In Regina v Lambert73 Lord Woolf observed: 
 
 
It is…important to have in mind that legislation is passed by a democratically elected 
Parliament and therefore the courts under the Convention are entitled to and should, as a 
matter of constitutional principle, pay a degree of deference to the view of Parliament as to 
what is in the interest of the pubic generally when upholding the rights of the individual under 
the Convention.74  
 
 
   This quote by Lord Woolf is a reminder to the judiciary of the respect that should be owed by 
them to Parliament when they are interpreting primary legislation in line with a convention right 
under section 3(1) of the HRA (or issuing a declaration of incompatibility under section 4(2) of 
the HRA – see below). 
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   There has been much debate about the exact meaning of section 3(1) of the HRA. Does the 
obligation give the court the power to interpret a statute in such a way that its meaning is 
contrary to the will of Parliament? Remember, the words “so far as possible to do so” mean that 
the obligation is not absolute: if a court cannot interpret the statute “so far as possible” it may 
issue a declaration of incompatibility under section 4(2). However in Regina v A (No.2)75 the 
House of Lords significantly altered the effects of section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1999 – the general prohibition on the cross examination of a complainant in a rape 
case about their previous sexual history – to achieve compatibility with Article 6 of the ECHR, 
the right to a fair trial by an independent and impartial tribunal. Lord Steyn said: “[It] will 
sometimes be necessary to adopt an interpretation which linguistically may appear strained”.76 
Nicol has described this as “…[straying] far from the wording of the provision and Parliament’s 
clear intention in introducing it” and “[t]his clarity of parliamentary purpose in no way inhibited 
the House of Lords. Nor did the fact that the words of the statute were as plain as day”.77 
 
   The courts seemed to retreat from this approach – even Lord Steyn – in Regina (Anderson) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department.78 In this later case Lord Steyn said: “…section 3(1) 
is not available where the suggested interpretation is contrary to express statutory words or by 
implication necessarily contradicted by the statute”.79 In the light of this, and other speeches in 
the House of Lords such as those in Re S80 and Bellinger v Bellinger,81 Nicol has therefore 
argued that the House of Lords is less inclined to find a Convention compliant interpretation of 
the statute (and more inclined to declare an Act of Parliament incompatible under s.4(2) of the 
HRA – see below).82 This has been criticised by Kavangh who persuasively argues that the 
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context and individual circumstances are more likely to explain judicial approaches to s.3(1), 
rather than any fundamental change of mind about the section.83 For example, she refers to the 
potential for legal reform as a factor in the courts deciding whether to exercise their powers 
under s.3(1) or s.4(2). In Bellinger the House of Lords declined to interpret “male” and “female” 
in s.11(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 to include a transsexual female under s.3(1) of the 
HRA for the purposes of marriage. Rather than arguing that this signaled a judicial retreat from 
s.3(1), which was Nicol’s argument, Kavanagh said one of the justifications for the courts 
issuing a declaration of incompatibility was because the particular change in the law was 
inappropriate for the judiciary: it required extensive inquiry and the widest public consultation 
and discussion, so was more suitable for Parliamentary reform.84  
 
   The interplay between sections 3(1) and 4(2) of the HRA seems to have been settled for the 
foreseeable future by the House of Lords in Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza.85 When amending 
provisions of the Rent Act 1977 to make them comply with Articles 8 and 14 of the ECHR, thus 
allowing a surviving gay partner to inherit his deceased lover’s tenancy, Lord Nicholls said:  
 
 
[The] intention of Parliament in enacting section 3 was that, to an extent bounded only by 
what is ‘possible’, a court can modify the meaning, and hence the effect, of primary and 
secondary legislation. Parliament, however, cannot have intended that in the discharge of this 
extended interpretative function the courts should adopt a meaning inconsistent with a 
fundamental feature of legislation.86  
 
 
 25 
   The courts are therefore prepared to assess the merits of legislation to some degree to make it 
interpretively Convention compatible. However, it will be recalled that this obligation under 
s.3(1) of the HRA is not absolute: it is qualified by the phrase “as far as possible to do so”. To 
this end, there should still be judicial restraint into the merits of a statute’s compliance where an 
interpretation would clearly contradict the ethos of the legislation. 
 
The legitimacy of low standards of intervention and section 4(2) of the HRA 
 
Section 3(1) of the HRA is not unqualified. Where a Convention compliant interpretation of a 
statute is not possible a court may issue a declaration of incompatibility under s.4(2) of the HRA. 
Some guidance as to the exercise of this judicial power has recently been given by the House of 
Lords in R (Animal Defenders International) v Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport.87 
Here the court was considering whether the ban on political advertising on television and radio in 
sections 319 and 321 of the Communications Act 2003 was incompatible with Article 10(1) of 
the ECHR. Despite Lord Bingham saying: “the importance of free expression is such that the 
standard of justification required of member states is high and their margin of appreciation 
correspondingly small, particularly where political speech is in issue”,88 the court still held that 
the ban was not unlawful. In determining that ultimately the balance favoured the state here, 
Lord Bingham observed: 
 
 
The weight to be accorded to the judgment of Parliament depends on the circumstances and 
the subject matter. In the present context it should in my opinion be given great weight, for 
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three main reasons. First, it is reasonable to expect that our democratically-elected politicians 
will be peculiarly sensitive to the measures necessary to safeguard the integrity of our 
democracy. It cannot be supposed that others, including judges, will be more so. Secondly, 
Parliament has resolved, uniquely since the 1998 Act came into force in October 2000, that the 
prohibition of political advertising on television and radio may possibly, although improbably, 
infringe article 10 but has nonetheless resolved to proceed…The judgment of Parliament on 
such an issue should not be lightly overridden. Thirdly, legislation cannot be framed so as to 
address particular cases. It must lay down general rules…A general rule means that a line 
must be drawn, and it is for Parliament to decide where…89 
 
 
   Arguably, therefore, a particularly wide area of discretion was seemingly afforded to the 
statute by the House of Lords.90 Lord Bingham had said that this depended on the circumstances 
and subject matter of the case. As a general rule what might these be? The earlier case of 
International Transport Roth v Secretary of State for the Home Department91 offers some 
explanation. Here the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 had imposed penalties on those who 
allowed illegal entrants into the UK. The usual penalty was £2000 per entrant payable within 60 
days, subject to some exceptions such as the defence of duress, which the carrier had to prove. 
The burden of proof was therefore reversed, that is, it was the responsibility of the defence, the 
carrier, to prove innocence rather than the prosecution to prove guilt. Furthermore, the carrier 
could be detained until the fine had been paid, and no compensation would be paid to an 
innocent carrier who had been detained because of an unreasonable penalty notice.  
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   The Court of Appeal ruled that the reversal of the burden of proof, coupled with the further 
sanctions, was unfair and incompatible with Article 6 of the ECHR, the right to a fair trial by an 
independent and impartial court or tribunal.92 In so doing, Laws LJ argued that a greater degree 
of deference should be accorded to Acts of Parliament than to subordinate legislation or a 
decision of the executive.93 Of course, other issues pertaining to the circumstances and the 
subject matter of the case (to use the words of Lord Bingham in Animal Defenders International) 
may outweigh the respect shown by the judiciary to the legislation at issue. To this end, Laws LJ 
identified other factors which were relevant to the degree of deference shown by the courts. 
Judges were more likely to interfere where the right under consideration was an absolute right 
such as the right to life rather than a qualified right such as freedom of expression;94 and the 
subject matter was more within the competence of Parliament than the judiciary, such as the 
defence of the realm.95 Although this was a dissenting judgment by Laws LJ, it has received 
much attention and seems to be an accepted view that a degree of deference should be shown by 
the courts to statutes when issuing a declaration of incompatibility under s.4(2) of the HRA.96 Is 
an intensive process of merits-review here therefore justified? 
 
   Degrees of deference shown by judges when assessing infringements of the ECHR and 
sections 3(1) and 4(2) of the HRA, illustrating the intensity with which the courts review merits, 
inevitably differ depending upon which Article is under consideration, and the context in which 
it arises. Indeed, standards differ between judges in the same case97 and between judges more 
generally.98 Such an argument leads one to question when the courts are, categorically, acting 
unconstitutionally in reviewing the merits of executive action? This is maybe an impossible 
question to answer. For example, Allan has argued:  
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The boundaries [of executive]…autonomy…cannot be settled independently of all the 
circumstances of the particular case; for only the facts of the particular case can reveal the extent 
to which any individual right is implicated and degree to which relevant public interests may 
justify the right’s curtailment or qualification...There is…no means of defining the scope of 
judicial powers, or prescribing the limits of official discretion, as regards the details of any 
particular case, without examination of the specific legal issues arising in all the circumstances. 99 
 
 
   However, the author is uncomfortable with proceeding on this basis as it affords no certainty to 
the executive about the boundaries of its power. For constitutional reasons the executive must surely 
be permitted some latitude in its decision-making – whatever the context.  
 
Substitution of judgment as a limit to the judicial review of merits 
 
In arguing that English law should recognise the proportionality test as a stand alone ground of 
review, Craig does not go as far as advocating a standard of intervention equivalent to judicial 
substitution of judgment.100 He defines this approach as the substitution of choice as to how the 
discretion ought to have been exercised for that of the administrative authority. The courts would in 
other words reassess the matter afresh and decide, for example, whether funds ought to be allocated 
in one way rather than another.101 There are other commentators such as Clayton who support the 
view that substitution of judgment is an absolute limit to the judicial review of merits102 - even 
when applying the proportionality test, which by its very nature increases the likelihood of a 
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reconsideration of the merits of an administrative decision. He argues that despite varying 
standards of the principle applied amongst Commonwealth jurisdictions, there is universal 
acknowledgment that the court is exercising a review function and is not substituting its own 
judgment for that of the original decision-maker.103 From a domestic law perspective, Hickman, 
in an excellent assessment of the proportionality test, analyses the different approaches to the 
principle that the UK courts have employed. He finds that the test is still one of review.104 Where 
the ECHR right is absolute and unqualified, meaning proportionality is generally excluded, 
Sayeed impliedly agrees about the minimum standard of judicial intervention to be employed: he 
states that the judiciary would never usurp the executive by substituting the latter’s decision.105 
 
   The courts are also unequivocal in their assertions that judicial review for suspected breaches 
of the ECHR does not involve them in substitution of judgment. For example, when discussing 
the adoption of the proportionality principle to breaches of qualified rights under the HRA, Lord 
Steyn in Daly said that intervention by the courts was still one of review rather than appeal: “The 
differences in approach between the traditional grounds of review and the proportionality 
approach may…sometimes yield different results…This does not mean that there has been a shift 
to merits-review”.106 
 
In the context of this article where degrees of intervention on the merits are examined, the phrase 
“merits-review” used by Lord Steyn may not necessarily imply judicial substitution of judgment. 
The later ruling of the House of Lords in Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department107 
clarifies what Lord Steyn was saying. Here the court had to decide on the intensity of the 
proportionality test to be employed by an immigration appeal adjudicator, meaning: the issue 
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which separated the applicants and the Secretary of State was whether or not the adjudicator 
should decide for himself, on the merits, whether the removal was proportionate or not. The 
Secretary of State had argued that the adjudicator’s assessment of proportionality should be 
limited to a review of his decision, and only ask whether or not it was within the range of 
reasonable assessments of proportionality.108 In rejecting the argument of the latter, Lord 
Bingham maintained: 
 
 
[Lord Steyn’s] statement has, it seems, given rise to some misunderstanding…The point 
which, as we understand, Lord Steyn wished to make was that, although the Convention calls 
for a more exacting standard of review, it remains the case that the judge is not the primary 
decision-maker.109 
 
 
   The message is therefore clear: the judicial review of discretionary powers, whatever the 
circumstances, is still a supervisory function of the courts. Although a greater judicial 
consideration of the merits of administrative decisions affecting rights is permitted since the 
coming into force of the HRA, the executive reserves the right not to have their judgments 
substituted by the courts; this is the limit of judicial power.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Orthodox principles of public law prescribe that judicial review is not an appellate jurisdiction. The 
courts are merely supervising the lawfulness of administrative decision-making, that is, they are 
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ensuring that the executive is working within the implied boundaries of a discretionary power 
conferred on it by the Legislature. The administrative decision-maker has been granted a discretion 
as a constitutional recognition that s/he is in the best position to act in most circumstances. The 
irrationality ground of review is defined in a way that acknowledges this so (in theory) provides the 
executive with the latitude to decide upon several courses of action within a particular discretion. 
Intervention by a reviewing court under this head of challenge should therefore be undertaken only 
when a decision is not within a range of options available to a rational decision-maker.  
 
   However, the first article in this study found that the courts were in fact adopting low standards of 
irrationality and thus were reviewing the merits of administrative activity. Therefore, the second 
article in this study set out to examine the constitutionality of these low standards of judicial 
intervention. It concluded that some of these merits-reviews previously identified had in reality been 
legitimate by reference either to the actual test of review employed by the court (proportionality 
instead of irrationality, for example) or because the fundamental rights of the applicant had been 
unjustifiably infringed. With the advent of the HRA, this article has found that the constitutionality 
of the judicial review of the merits of discretionary powers has obviously widened: assessing the 
engagement of “qualified” rights of the ECHR demands a proportionality type of approach, for 
example. The very nature of this test is the notion of balance, a consideration of two competing 
interests: the private right of the applicant to privacy, expression, association etc and the public duty 
of the state to protect national security, prevent disorder and crime and so on.  
 
   Qualified rights are not the only rights which legitimately engage low standards of review: some 
absolute rights of the ECHR like Article 2, the right to life, also employ the proportionality test. In 
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cases of fatal shootings by the police, for example, Article 2(2) permits the intentional deprivation 
of life but only where the use of lethal force is for a legitimate object like prevention of unlawful 
violence and “absolutely necessary”. In assessing a potential unlawful breach of Article 2(2), a 
reviewing court must adopt a strict proportionality approach, that is, the justifications by the state 
for the killing must be subjected to particular scrutiny. A low standard of judicial intervention in this 
context is therefore justifiable. However, the adoption of proportionality review does not necessarily 
engage a significant review of the merits of executive action. For instance, where certain justifiable 
state aims like public morality are being pursued, the intensity with which the courts review merits 
should be smaller. Furthermore, in other situations the courts should also adopt a degree of restraint 
over the control of executive powers: exercising their interpretive obligation under s.3(1) of the 
HRA and issuing a declaration of incompatibility under s.4(2) of the HRA being obvious examples.  
 
   The legitimate standards of judicial intervention under the HRA do therefore differ depending on 
the Article of the ECHR under assessment, the context in which the Article arises and even the 
nature of the remedy claimed. This is arguably unsatisfactory from the executive’s perspective: 
there must still be a region of administrative decision-making from which the courts are excluded. 
In this regard, a secondary purpose of this third article in the study of irrationality has been to 
evaluate this constitutional repositioning of the judiciary, with a view to establishing where this new 
‘fault line’ lies between it and the executive. The growth in the power of the courts at the expense of 
the executive, especially since the coming into force of the HRA in 2000, has made substantial in-
roads into the merits of administrative decision-making, to the point where substitution of judgment 
is now the absolute limit of the courts’ power. In a subsequent article the author will question 
whether this boundary of judicial decision-making affords the executive an appropriate degree of 
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latitude to undertake its governmental duties. The author suspects that this smaller zone of lawful 
administrative activity is too narrow. To this end, for reasons of democracy, it will be argued that 
legitimate standards of judicial intervention on the grounds of irrationality should therefore be 
raised so that the executive is permitted a sufficient measure of discretion from which to exercise 
fully the responsibilities conferred on it by the Legislature. 
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